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Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights
Amendment Ratification: Who
Decides and How?
By LEO KANOWITZ* and MARILYN KLINGER**

On March 22, 1972, by a vote of 84 to 9,1 the United States Senate
adopted a joint resolution proposing the addition of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) to the United States Constitution.2 This resolution
was previously adopted by the House of Representatives by a vote of

354 to 24 on October 12, 1971.1 Pursuant to the joint resolution's
language the proposed amendment must be ratified by at least threefourths (thirty-eight) of the fifty state legislatures within seven years of
the resolution's passage (i.e., by March 22, 1979) to become part of the
Constitution. 4 If fewer than thirty-eight state legislatures have ratified
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
**

Member, second year class, University of California, Hastings College of the

Law.
1. 188 CoNG. REc. 9598 (1972).
2. "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That
the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from
the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article"Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
"Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
"Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification." S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), 86 Stat. 1523.
3. 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971).
4. For a legislative history of the ERA up to 1971 see Brown, Emerson, Falk
& Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 981 (1971). For recent legislative action on the amendment see S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (report from the Committee
on the Judiciary presented by Senator Birch Bayh for vote in the Senate).
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by that date, the proponents of the ERA, should they wish to continue
their efforts to add such an amendment to the Constitution, would have
to start anew.
As of this writing, thirty-five states have ratified the ERA.' It
would thus appear that only three more state legislative ratifications are
needed by March 1979 to complete the ratification process and for the
amendment to become the twenty-seventh of the United States Constitution. A problem has arisen, however, with three of those state ratifications. Tennessee, Nebraska, and Idaho, having first ratified the amendment, have since purported to rescind their earlier ratifications.' In
addition, because of efforts exerted by the amendment's opponents,
further rescissions could occur by March 22, 1979.1 As a result of
these developments, to achieve the requisite thirty-eight state ratifications, the final count may have to include one or more states that first
ratified and subsequently attempted to rescind their ratifications.
The above problem raises two initial questions. First, which
branch of the federal government is to decide whether those rescinded
ratifications should be included in the final count-the United States
Supreme Court or the United States Congress? Second, how should the
substantive issue be resolved on the merits?
It is possible that, when March 22, 1979 arrives, the questions
posed herein will have been mooted by events. Conceivably, in view of
the strong support evinced for the ERA by President Carter (and
increased efforts by ERA supporters),' more than thirty-eight unre5. The thirty-five states that have ratified are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota. Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
6. LEG. RES. No. 9, 83d Leg., 1st Sess., 1973 NEa. LAWS 1547, TENN. S.J. RES.
29, 88th Gen. Assembly (1974); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1977, at 18, col. 6.
7. Idaho and Kansas have contemplated rescission as of 1973. Note, Reversals
in the Federal Constitutional Amendment Process: Efficacy of State Ratifications of
the Equal Rights Amendment, 49 IND. L.J. 147 n.3 (1973).
8. During his presidential campaign Jimmy Carter sent telegrams to Democratic
leaders in the sixteen states that had not yet ratified the amendment on August 23.
1976. He stated: "I am committed to equality between men and women in every area
of government and in every aspect of life.
"The Carter-Mondale team will make it clear to the American people that, despite
charges to the contrary, the ERA is not an elitist issue but one that affects the economic
and social well-being of all Americans.
"While we have seen some progress in changing our laws to prevent discrimination
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scinded state legislative ratifications will have occurred by then, obviating
the need to include any rescinded ratifications in the count.0 On the
other hand, the ERA may encounter hard times in the next few years.
Voter rejection of proposed state equal rights amendments to the New
York and New Jersey constitutions in November 197510 suggests that
new state legislative ratifications of the ERA may be difficult to attain.
As a result of such setbacks and widespread apprehensions, unfounded
as they might be, that the proposed amendment portends a disruption of
familiar life patterns, the nation may have to confront the problem
suggested above: whether states which have withdrawn their earlier
ratifications are to be counted as having ratified the amendment when
the final tally is made.
Our conclusions are as follows: (1) the United States Supreme
Court, rather than Congress, is the branch of government to decide the
question of rescindability, as this is a justiciable issue and not a political
question; (2) a state, once having ratified the ERA, may not rescind,
and any purported rescission by a state is of no legal effect; (3) even if
the Court should decide that the issue is nonjusticiable, that is, one to be
decided by Congress rather than the Court, Congress should count all
state ratifications of the ERA without regard to subsequent efforts to
rescind.
Article V of the Constitution
The amending process of the federal Constitution is set forth in
article V." The article provides for two alternative methods of initiating proposed amendments and two alternative methods for ratifying
them. An amendment can be, and all twenty-six existing amendments
have been, initiated upon adoption of a joint resolution by a two-thirds
against women, these steps must not be used as an excuse to withhold from women
the full guarantees of the Constitution." N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1976, at 13, col. 3.
9. Although the issue, presented here with specific reference to the ERA may
be mooted by events, the underlying constitutional questions of the efficacy and justiciability of ratification and attempted rescission of constitutional amendments will be before the nation until they are finally resolved. Many of the underlying considerations
of this article can be applied to future amendments.
10. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
11. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress. . . ...U.S. CONST. art. V.
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vote of each house of Congress. The second method, which has never
been employed, authorizes Congress, upon application from two-thirds
of the state legislatures, to convoke a national convention for proposing
amendments. 2 If an amendment is ultimately proposed, either by joint
resolution or convention, such amendment
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of [the] Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress
13

In other words, Congress proposes the ratification method' 4 and upon
ratification by three-fourths of the states-either by legislative decree or
by convention-the amendment becomes a part of the Constitution.
Justiciability vs. Political Question
Marbury v. Madison: The Classic Theory of Judicial Review
In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the decision in Marbury v. Madison" in which he declared: "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . .The
judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under
the constitution." 6 In the light of this unequivocal statement of principle, it would seem that any case or controversy arising under article V of
the Constitution is subject to judicial review, i.e., justiciable. Indeed,
from 1798 to 1939 the Supreme Court agreed.
Prior to 1939
Before 1939, the United States Supreme Court consistently held
that issues relating to the amendment of the federal Constitution were
clearly justiciable. Five of the justices who joined in the opinion of the
Court in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 7 holding that presidential approval
was not required in the constitutional amending process, had been
involved directly in the conception and birth of the Constitution.1 8
12. For a discussion of congressional attempts to enact ratification procedures
binding on state legislatures, see text accompanying notes 145-55 infra.
13.

U.S. CONST. art. V.

14. All of the constitutional amendments to date have been ratified by the state
legislative method except for the twenty-first amendment (repeal of prohibition).
15. 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. Id. at 177-78.
17. 3 U.S. (3Dall.) 378 (1798).
18. The five Justices were William Cushing, James Wilson, James Iredell, Samuel
Chase, and Oliver Ellsworth. See 1 L. FRIEDMAN & F.ISRAEL, THE JUs'ncES OF THE
SUPREME COURT:

1789-1969, at 57-70, 79-96, 121-32, 185-98, 223-15 (1969).
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These five justices presumed without discussion that article V issues

were subject to judicial review.
The nineteenth century courts were not faced with the present
question. But in the early 1920s four cases decided by the Supreme

Court dealt specifically with article V. In Hawke v. Smith19 the Court
invalidated an Ohio constitutional provision requiring submittal of proposed United States constitutional amendments to popular referendum
because it did not accord with the term "legislatures" in article V. The
Court stressed:
[R]atification by a State of a constitutional amendment is not an act
of legislation within the proper sense of the word.
[T~he power to ratify a proposed amendment to20the Federal
Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution.
The validity of the procedures used to exercise this power was a question
arising under the Constitution. Hence, judicial review was based on
article III, section 2.21

In the National ProhibitionCases in

1920,22

the Court interpreted

the language of article V, "two-thirds of both Houses," to mean two-

thirds of the members present and voting of a quorum. Dillon
v. Gloss,23 decided the following year, held that a congressionally imposed seven year limit within which the states could ratify an amendment
was reasonable and "that the fair inference or implication from Article V.
is that the ratification must be within some reasonable time after the
proposal.'24 In 1922, the Court in Leser v. Garnett"'25 judged the
ratifications of the nineteenth amendment by Missouri, Tennessee, and
West Virginia effective although state constitutional and procedural
provisions allegedly rendered the ratifications inoperative. 26 In addi19. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
20. Id. at 229-30. The California Attorney General has opined that the California electorate cannot effectively rescind, by the initiative process, the state's legislative
ratification of the ERA. 58 Op. Arr'y GEN. 830 (1975).
21. Cf. Burke, Validity of Attempts to Rescind Ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 8 U.W.L.A.L. Rv. 1, 7 (1976).
22. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
23. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
24. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
25. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
26. The ratifying resolutions of Missouri and Tennessee were allegedly adopted
in violation of the constitutions of those two states. Missouri had a provision in its
constitution disallowing assent to a federal constitutional amendment if it impaired the
right of local self-government. MO. CONsr. art. 2, § 3, quoted in Leser v. Garnett,
139 Md. 46, 68, 114 A. 840, 846 (1921). Tennessee's constitution prohibited action
on a proposed federal constitutional amendment unless the General Assembly had been
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tion, in United States v. Sprague,"7 the Court held that the choice
between ratification by state legislature or by convention was within the
discretion of Congress, rejecting the argument that ratification by convention was constitutionally required because the eighteenth amendment
dealt with "powers over individuals. 28 That the Court unhesitatingly
decided the issues presented by these cases suggests that the justiciability
of questions arising from the amending process was, in the Court's view,
a self-evident truth.2 9 In 1939, however, the Supreme Court decided a
case that seemed to change all that had preceded it.
Coleman v. Miller: Dictum or Law?
Coleman v. Miller,3 ° or more precisely, language in that case, raises
the principal obstacle to any conclusion that the United States Supreme
Court, rather than Congress, is the ultimate arbiter of the effectiveness
of purported state withdrawals of earlier ERA ratifications.
The issue of Coleman v. Miller arose from the absence of a
3
deadline date for ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment '
submitted by Congress in 1924. In 1925 the Kansas legislature rejected
elected after the amendment was submitted. TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 32, quoted in Leser
v. Garnett, supra at 68, 114 A. 840, 846-47 (1921).
The Court rejected a challenge
to the ratifying resolutions of these two states on the grounds that ratification is a
federal function, transcending state imposed limitations. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130, 137 (1922).
Moreover, the resolutions of ratification by West Virginia and Tennessee were challenged as being in violation of those states' rules of legislative procedure
thereby rendering them inoperative. See Leser v. Garnett, 139 Md. 46, 71-73, 114 A.
840, 847-48 (1921). The United States Supreme Court rejected this challenge holding
that notice by the state to the federal government of ratification was conclusive upon
the Court. 258 U.S. at 137.
27. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
28. Id. at 729.
29. The state courts likewise had consistently held that the amending process in
its entirety was justiciable. "The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding
that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the
requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt
that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of
the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner
required by the Constitution .... ." In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 409-10, 119
N.W. 408, 415 (1909) (judicial resolution of challenge to state constitutional amendment regarding taxes on balloting error grounds). See also Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark.
432, 96 S.W. 396 (1906) (judicially determined whether proposed state constitutional
amendment received the majority of votes); Commonwealth v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46
A. 505 (1900) (judicially determined whether the submission of a state constitutional
amendment may be by resolution as well as by legislative act approved by the executive).
30. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
31. 43 Stat. 670 (1924) (originated in the House of Representatives).
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the proposed amendment and so certified to the United States secretary
of state. Twelve years later the Kansas Senate, with the aid of a tiebreaking vote from the state's lieutenant governor, voted to ratify that
same previously rejected amendment. The Kansas House of Representatives followed suit.
Almost immediately thereafter a mandamus proceeding was
brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by members of the Kansas
Senate challenging the Kansas legislature's action on grounds that, inter
alia, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality because of the previous rejections by Kansas and other states and the undue length of time
the amendment had awaited ratification. The state's supreme court
upheld the ratification,32 and certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court.3 3
The Court initially discussed the previous congressional treatment
of ratifications following rejections and also withdrawals of previous
ratifications of constitutional amendments, noting that Congress had
34
determined that neither rejections nor withdrawals have any effect.
The Court then concluded:
[IThe question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures,
in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be
regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress .... 35
It is important to note that the Court in Coleman was presented only
with the justiciability of the Kansas legislature's attempt at ratification
following an earlier rejection of the Child Labor Amendment. 36 Its
language regarding the justiciability of cases involving rescission of
ratification went beyond the immediate issue presented to it. Nevertheless Coleman v. Miller was the first (and only) decision to announce
that purported state withdrawals of earlier ratifications and state ratifications of earlier rejected amendments presented nonjusticiable political
questions, though dictum in the 1849 case of Luther v. Borden37 had
32.
33.

Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390, 71 P.2d 518 (1938).
Coleman v. Miller, 303 U.S. 632 (1938).

34. 307 U.S. at 447-49. See notes 115-17 infra.
35. 307 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added).
36. Id.; cf. L OnRsmtD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CoNstirIoN 18-19
(1942) [hereinafter cited as ORFIELD]. "It should be carefully noted that [the Court]
did not hold all questions concerning the amending process to be political. The effect
of the previous rejection by a state of an amendment [and tihe interval of time in
which the states might ratify an amendment was.. . held to involve a political question.
Thus it is only as to these two questions that the court definitely decided that no justiciable question is involved." Id.
37. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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8

In Coleman, the Court stated two reasons for finding the ratification-rescission question a political one. First, Congress had previously
made the determination as to the effectiveness of subsequent action.
Second, the Court saw no constitutional or statutory basis for judicial
interference.39 The first reason seems to be a classic example of mistaking the familiar for the necessary. 4° The second reason is also questionable, since, as Professor Orfield has observed, "there were no stronger
constitutional or statutory bases for the decisions rendered"'" in Dillon
v. Gloss, Leser v. Garnett, or any of the numerous other cases arising
under article V.
Moreover, an examination of the vote in Coleman reveals that four
concurring justices insisted, inter alia, that article V matters were political and were therefore never justiciable.4 2 Three justices would have
limited nonjusticiability to the narrow facts of the case: ratification by
a state when the same amendment had been earlier rejected by that
state.43 Two dissenters regarded the article V issues raised in Coleman
as susceptible to judicial determination, since Dillon v. Gloss had adjudicated similar issues without hesitation.4 4 Coleman v. Miller can therefore be viewed, in spite of its far-ranging dictum, as leaving open the
question whether the purported rescission of a state's earlier ratification
of a constitutional amendment is a justiciable matter.
A showing that Coleman's treatment of purported withdrawals of
state ratifications of constituional amendments is dictum has no impact
if it is determined that its finding of nonjusticiability as to rejectionratification issues logically compels a finding of nonjusticiability as to
ratification-rescission issues. Indeed, this poses a considerable problem.
The Coleman Court's conclusion that the effect of a previous rejection
38. Although the Court in Luther was examining the validity of Rhode Island's
new government, Chief Justice Taney deviated from the main issue to remark: "In
forming the constitutions of the different States . . . and in the various changes and
alterations which have since been made, the political department has always determined
whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of
the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision." Id. at 39.

39.
40.
to review
Id. at 20.
41.
42.
43.
44.

ORFIELD,

supra note 36, at 20.

"[I]t seems an unusual approach for the body recognized as having the power
acts of Congress to adopt and rely on an act of Congress as precedent.
Id.
307
Id.
Id.

See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
U.S. at 459 (Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
at 450 (Hughes, Stone, & Reed, JJ.).
at 474 (Butler & McReynolds, JJ., dissenting).
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of a subsequent ratification is nonjusticiable was based on an historical
survey showing that either Congress or its delegatee, the secretary of
state, 4' had always made the determination whether enough states had

ratified a proposed amendment to make it law. The Coleman Court
apparently felt that determining the effect of a prior rejection on a state's
ratification was part of the process of counting up the number of states
ratifying an amendment. If this is true, the effect of a purported
withdrawal of ratification would also seem part of the same process.
There is a way to overcome this hurdle. We have said that the
Coleman Court's statement that the effect of a purported withdrawal of
a ratification by a state is dictum. It is also possible to view as dictum
the Court's statement on the justiciability of the direct problem presented to them-the effect of a rejection on a subsequent ratification.
This view derives from the second holding of Coleman v.
Miller: that Congress has the power to declare a proposed amendment
no longer viable and to refuse recognition of its ratification if too much
time has passed since the amendment was originally proposed. In
Coleman, there was clearly great doubt as to whether the child labor
amendment was still viable after thirteen years. In fact, two dissenting
justices4 6 insisted that the amendment was indeed no longer viable. Thus
it may have been unnecessary for the Court to determine the effect of a
prior rejection on a state's ratification since in fact the question might
have been moot in light of the nonviability of the child labor amendment. Therefore, even the language in Coleman pertaining to the noncan be considered dictum
justifiability of the rejection-ratification issue
47
case.
the
of
disposition
the
to
not necessary
When a rejection-ratification issue relating to an amendment that is
clearly still viable is presented to the Supreme Court, then the Court will
be free to determine the question directly, unfettered by any direct and
inevitable holding of the Coleman v. Miller decision. If Congress
continues its practice of requiring ratification within seven years,48 the
45. See note 118 infra.
46. The dissents of Justices Butler and McReynolds consisted almost entirely of
quotations from the Dillon case. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
47. This discussion pertaining to the Coleman case is also applicable to Coleman's
companion case, Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939), in which the Court summarily
dismissed the case on the ground that after certification of ratification had been forwarded to the secretary of state there no longer was a justiciable controversy.
48. "Beginning with the proposed 18th amendment, Congress has customarily included a provision requiring ratification within 7 years from the time of the submission
to the States." SENATE LIBRARY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. DOc. No. 163, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1963).
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Court will be presented only with ratification issues relating to viable
amendments, as is the case in the present ERA controversy.
Baker v. Carr
The contours of the political question doctrine have taken on new
dimensions in recent Supreme Court decisions, most notably in the
49
landmark case of Baker v. Carr.

In Baker v. Carr, plaintiffs, state voters, asserted that their state
legislature was apportioned in a manner violating the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. Attacks on malapportionment had
been mounted prior to 1962, both on the basis of the equal protection
clause and on the basis of the "republican form of government" guarantee of article IV, section 4. These attacks had been uniformly rejected
on the ground that legislative apportionment was a question involving
the allocation of political power and was not justiciable in the courts.
The Court in Baker v. Carr, however, decided for the first time
that the equal protection claim presented by malapportionment should
indeed be justiciable,5" and while Baker v. Carr is generally regarded
as a landmark equal protection case, it is important for present purposes
because of the majority opinion's survey of past Supreme Court decisions on the justiciability-political question issue, 5' followed by a succinct restatement of the present state of the law on this question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.5 The Court then observed:
Unless one of uithe above] formulations is extricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the
ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which
is one of "political questions," not one of "political
we treat
53
cases."1

49. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 210-17.
52. Id. at 217.

53.

Id.
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Applying this new test to the equal protection challenge to the malapportioned state legislature in Baker itself, the Court concluded that the
case could be decided on the merits.54
A careful reading of the Baker tests for determining the presence
or absence of a poiitical question suggests that they are by no means free
of ambiguity. These guidelines leave much room for the exercise of
'judicial discretion in their application to specific factual situations. Their
production of the Baker result on the merits is probably best explained
by the practical need for the Court to act in the malapportionment
situation, since, for a variety of reasons, most notably a revulsion to the
idea of committing political suicide, no other branch of government was
likely to act under the circumstances.
Powell v. McCormack
If the Court took the bold step that it did in Baker v. Carrbecause,
in the absence of judicial action, no other body could or would do
anything to remedy the inequities in state legislative apportionment, the
Court's resolution of the political question-justiciability dispute in Powell v. McCormack5 5 cannot be explained on such pragmatic grounds. In
that case, Adam Clayton Powell, a member of the United States House
of Representatives, was denied his seat in the House5" by over a twothirds vote of his colleagues. Powell had been accused of engaging in
misconduct both related and unrelated to his governmental duties as
representative and committee chairman. In the appeal by Powell and
voters of his congressional district following suit seeking reinstatement
of Powell to his House seat, the respondents, members and custodians of
the House of Representatives, contended, inter alia, that the decision to
exclude Powell was supported by the expulsion power in article I,
section 557 of the federal Constitution. That power, respondents
argued, allowed the House to expel a member for reasons set forth by
that body. Respondents also maintained that the issue was not justiciable because it involved a political question.
54. Id. at 237.
55. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
56.

H.R. Res. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CoNG. Rgc. 24 (1967).

Two years

later Congressman Powell was seated and sworn in and a fine was imposed.
Res. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 33-34 (1969).
57.

H.R.

"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications

of its own Members ....
"'o o .

o

"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S.
CoNsr. art. I, § 5.

990
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The Court, in holding that Powell was improperly excluded from
his membership in the House and requiring that he be permitted to take
his rightful place in that body, concluded that the case did not involve a
political question but that, on the contrary, it presented a justiciable
issue." Specifically, the Court's extended examination of relevant historical materials59 revealed that congressional power, under article I,
section 5, to judge the qualifications of its members was "at most a
'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge only the
qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution, ' 60 those requirements of age, citizenship, and residence contained in article I, section
2.Y' As a result, concluded the Court, the House was without the power
62
to exclude a member-elect who met the Constitution's requirements.
The Powell decision is especially significant in that it reflects an
awareness on the part of the Court that the American "system of
government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document
by another branch.""3 In the Court's view:
Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded
courts to interpret the law and does not involve a "lack of the
respect due [a] coordinate [branch] of government," nor does it
involve an "initial '6policy
determination of a kind clearly for non4
judicial discretion."
The Present Mood of the Court: Justice Powell, an Illustration
The opinion in Powell not only recognized the essential role of the
Court as the ultimate interpreter of the meaning of constitutional language, it also signaled the Court's reassertion of its supremacy within its
own sphere and of its right to exercise its constitutional prerogatives,
especially in relation to Congress.
58. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Burger, before he was appointed
to the Supreme Court, wrote the court of appeals decision which was reversed by the
Supreme Court. In the decision, Burger affirmed the dismissal by the district court
but not because of lack of jurisdiction as the lower court had decided but on political
question grounds applying the Baker v. Carr test. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d
577 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
59. 395 U.S. at 521-48.
60. Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
61. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age
of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be Chosen."

U.S. CONST.art. I, § 2.
62.
63.
64.

395 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 548-49, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Powell v. McCormack, moreover, appears to be a sound applicaof
tion Baker's constitutional test for justiciability. At the same time, it
evokes a mood of judicial activism, 5 a willingness to reach out to
resolve social issues that other branches of government ignored. 60 Although in Baker the Court asserted that "[t]he nonjusticiability of' ' a7
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers,
derived directly from the Constitution, there is so much room for
discretionary manipulation of the Baker tests that one cannot help
suspecting that a finding by the Court of the presence of a political
question, like its determination of such related questions as standing,
ripeness, or mootness, may often reflect attitudes of members of the
Court on the appropriate role of the federal judiciary in the American
political system rather than the application of the Baker tests to new
factual situations.
Except for a few of its holdover members, the present Supreme
Court, which may confront the question of the justiciability of ERA
ratification withdrawals, clearly harbors different judicial philosophies
from the activist Warren Court.6"
The growing influence of Justice Powell, one of the newer members of the Court, on recent standing issues reflects the Court's increasing tendency to embrace the virtues of judicial self-restraint over the
activism of the Warren era. To be sure, in one sense standing implicates different concerns than those raised by the political question
doctrine.6 Yet the Court has noted that they are both aspects of the
70
fundamental problem of justiciability.
That is why Justice Powell's views, first expressed in a concurring
opinion in United States v. Richardson71 and later adopted as the
65. See note 68 infra.
66. Justice Powell, a leading spokesman for judicial restraint described it thus:
"Due to what many have regarded as the unresponsiveness of the Federal Government
to recognized needs or serious inequities in our society, recourse to the federal courts
has attained an unprecedented popularity in recent decades. Those courts have often
acted as a major instrument of social reform." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 191 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
68. See Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-judicial
Activism or Restraint? 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968). See also Mendelson, The Politics of Judicial Activism, 24 EMORY L.J. 43 (1975); Dorsen & Kurland, The Burger
Court-A Preliminary View, 28 RECORD 109 (1973); Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on
the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 Sup. CT. RE IEw 265 (1971).
69. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
70. But see id. at 98.
71. 418 U.S. 166, 180-97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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prevailing view of the Court in Warth v. Seldin, 72 reveal much about the
Court's present mood with respect to its relationship with Congress
when collisions between them are in the offing.
Richardson was a mandamus action by a federal taxpayer to
compel the secretary of the treasury to publish an accounting of the
receipts and expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency and to
enjoin any further publication of a consolidated statement which did not
reflect its receipts and expenditures. The taxpayer asserted standing to
bring the action based on the allegation that Congress had violated
article I, section 9, clause 773 of the Constitution.
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Burger, held the
taxpayer had failed to bring himself within the scope of the standing
requirements of Flast v. Cohen.7 4 The taxpayer's challenge was not
addressed to the taxing or spending power but to the statutes regulating
the CIA's accounting and reporting procedures; there was, consequently, no "logical nexus" between his status as "taxpayer" and the Congress' alleged failure to require more detailed reports of the CIA's
expenditures. 75 The Court also rejected the respondent's assertion that
he was aggrieved by the CIA's failure to account because he did not
satisfactorily "show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action ... ."171
Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the Richardson result, while rejecting, because of its own illogic,17 the Court's adherence to the "logical
nexus" test for taxpayer standing developed in Flast v.Cohen. That
72. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
73. "No Money Shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl.7.
74. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). "First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between [taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . . Secondly,
the taxpayer must establish a nexus between [taxpayer] status and the precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged." Id. at 102.

75.

418 U.S. at 175.

76. Id. at 177-78, quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
77. Justice Powell pointed out the various inconsistencies: "The opinion purports
to separate the question of standing from the merits . . . yet it abruptly returns to
the substantive issues raised by a plaintiff for the purpose of determining 'whether there
is a logical nexus .... .' 418 U.S. at 180-81. "Similarly, the opinion distinguishes
between constitutional and prudential [i.e., judicial self-restraintl limits on standing.
. . . I find it impossible, however, to determine whether the two-part 'nexus' test created in Flast amounts to a constitutional or a prudential limitation .... ." Id. at 181.
"[I]t
is impossible to see how an inquiry about the existence of 'concrete adverseness' [as
presented in Baker v. Carr] is furthered by an application of the Flast test." Id. at 182.
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illogic had been underscored in Flast itself both by Justice Harlan,7 8 a
leading proponent of judicial self-restraint, and by Justice Douglas,79 the
activist nonpareil.
What makes Justice Powell's concurrence inRichardson significant
for present purposes is his express rationale for agreeing with the result.
According to Justice Powell:
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. . . . [A]llowing unrestricted taxpayer or
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at
the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. . .
[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations
between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches
of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The
public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to
the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the
utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other
branches. s0
Furthermore, Justice Powell emphasized that the Court was the "insulated judicial branch"'' of the federal government. Allowing unrestricted
taxpayer or citizen standing, he stated, "underestimates the ability of the
representative branches of the Federal Government to respond to the
citizen pressure that has been responsible in large measure for the
'
concurrent drift toward expanded standing."82
Justice Powell concluded that the Court "should limit the expansion of federal taxpayer and
citizen standing in the absence of specific statutory authorization to an
'3
outer boundary drawn by the results in Flast and Baker v. Carr. 3
Taxpayer and citizen suits, he stressed, were attempts "to employ a
federal court as a forum in which to air . . .generalized grievances
about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the
Federal System. 8 4 The Court, he asserted, should affirm "traditional
prudential barriers" to disallow such use of the federal judiciary.
By 1975, the philosophical perspective of Justice Powell, revealed
78. "mhe Court's standard for the determination of standing [requisite personal
stake in the outcome] and its criteria for the satisfaction of that standard [logical link
between status and type of legislation attacked, and nexus between status and nature of
constitutional infringement alleged] are entirely unrelated." 392 U.S. at 122 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
79. "While I have joined the opinion of the Court, I do not think that the test
it lays down is a durable one for the reasons stated by my Brother Harlan.' Id. at
107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 189.
83. Id. at 196.
84. Id., quoting Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
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in his Richardson concurrence, had become the perspective of a Court
majority, as expressed in the Warth v. Seldin85 opinion written by Justice
Powell himself. In Warth, various petitioners had sought declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages against a town and members of its zoning,
planning and town boards, claiming that the town's zoning ordinance
excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town,
thereby violating petitioners' constitutional and statutory rights.,"
The opinion examined the relationships of the different petitioners
to the allegations set forth and then tested those relationships against
standing principles, concluding, to the dismay of the dissent, 7 that none
of the petitioners had sustained a claim to standing.
Justice Powell for the majority emphasized that standing requirements stem not only from constitutional dictates, but also from "prudential" considerations, thereby reiterating his views in the Richardson
concurrence. 8 Powell insisted that in both its constitutional and prudential dimensions standing "is founded in concern about the properand properly limited-role of the Courts in a democratic society." 9
The acquiescence by a majority of the Burger court in Warth v.
Seldin to the notion that the standing doctrine is based as much, if not
more, upon nonconstitutional "prudential" considerations as upon the
dictates of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine discloses a
mood of the Court in 1976 that is markedly different from what it was
at the time it rendered its opinions in Baker v. Carr (1962), Flast v.
Cohen (1968), and Powell v McCormack (1969). The Court's willingness to respect congressional authority as evidenced by Powell's
language in Richardson90 and Warth9 1 is diametrically opposed to the
85. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
86. Petitioners claimed that the zoning ordinance violated their constitutional
rights under the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments and statutory rights under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970). Similar claims have since been rejected by the Court in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555
(1977).
87. "[I]t is quite clear, when the record is viewed with dispassion, that at least
three of the groups of plaintiffs have made allegations, and supported them with affidavits and documentary evidence, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing." 422 U.S. at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974).
89. 422 U.S. at 498, citing U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Schlesinger held there was
no standing to bring a class action challenging Reserve membership of members of Congress as being in violation of the Incompatibility Clause of Art. I, § 6.
90. "Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government." 418 U.S. at 189.
91. "Without such [prudential] limitations . . . the courts would be called upon
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aggressive assertion of judicial prerogatives in the political question
arena in Baker and Powell. 2
As a result of these developments, it is not unlikely that the Court,
as presently constituted, may be less willing than in the past to resolve
the present ERA justiciability issue in a manner that precludes Congress from making a determination allegedly committed to it by the
Constitution.
On the other hand, despite such current philosophical tendencies
on the Court, the Baker v. Carr test remains its most authoritative
doctrinal definition of a nonjusticiable political question. As will be

demonstrated subsequently, applying that political question test to the
ERA rescindability issue points almost ineluctably to a conclusion of
justiciability.
The Baker v. Carr Test
Some phases of the Baker test can be disposed of as being clearly
inapplicable to the question at hand. For example, the "potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-

ments on one question" 93 relates to the foreign relations activities of
to decide abstract questions of wide public significance though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights." 422 U.S. at 500.
92. Justice Powell's views on the ERA itself may bear on his potential approach
to resolving the ratification question. The Court struck down a federal statute according
different benefits to male and female members of the uniformed services in Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Significantly, four justices asserted that sex, like
race, was a suspect classification and hence triggered close scrutiny. Id. at 682. Concurring, Justice Powell argued that the discriminatory government practice could be invalidated on the less rigorous rational basis standard on the authority of Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). More important, he suggested that characterizing sex classifications as "suspect" was inappropriate because the ERA was already making its way
through the ratification process. Id. at 692. In his view, "this reaching out to preempt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes." Id.
In expressing this view, Justice Powell may have overlooked the principal impetus behind
the ERA-previous inaction by the Court in response to numerous instances of official
sex discrimination challenged under existing constitutional provisions. See L. KANOWrT'Z, WOMEN AND THE LAW 1-99, 149-54 (1969). More recently, Justice Powell has
conceded that under recent Supreme Court cases, the "relatively deferential 'rational
basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address
a gender-based classification." Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). But this concession by no means undermines the attitude he expressed in
Frontiero of deferring to Congress in matters related to the ratification of the equal
rights amendment.
93. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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the United States government 4 and is therefore irrelevant to the present
issue. The same observation can be made with respect to "an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,"'9 ;
especially when, in the case of ERA ratification, whether a political decision has been made is precisely the point in question.
By contrast, other aspects of the Baker test are much more germane to the justiciability of the effect of a purported withdrawal by any
state of its prior ERA ratification. One such aspect is "the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government."9 6 The validity
of a state's rescission attempt hinges on the meaning of the constitutional
language "when ratified." It would seem that the Court's interpretation
of this language is no more indicative of a lack of the respect due a
coordinate branch of the federal government than are the frequently
encountered invalidations of congressional legislation on grounds that
97
the legislation exceeds constitutional authority.
Nor does a decision by the Court whether a state may rescind its
prior ratification of a pending constitutional amendment require "an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."9 8
The only policy determination involved in this issue is that laid out by
the framers of the Constitution, whose intentions have always been examined when the Court interprets constitutional language.
Another facet of the Baker test is "a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards" for resolving the issue.9 9 But the Court
94. "Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed
to the executive or legislative; but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced
statement of the Government's views." Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 217. An example of this principle occurred during the Reconstruction
when the Court, because of the need for solidarity of purpose, refused to rule on whether
the Georgia Constitution had been coerced by Congress and was therefore invalid.
White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1871).
96. 369 U.S. at 217. Baker partially relied on Field v. Clark in which the Court,
ruling on a challenge to the validity but not the authenticity of a signed United States
statute, stated: "The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department" to rely on congressional authentication to "determine . . . whether
the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 672 (1892). See also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
Leser relied
on Field in determining that the ratifications certified by the secretary of state were
conclusive upon the Court. Id. at 137.
97. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
"Such a determination
falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not in-

volve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate [branch] of government' .....
98.
99.

369 U.S. at 217.
Id.

Id. at 548.
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would be able through the process of interpreting constitutional language to explicate the meaning of10 0article V. The Court has always
found such a standard manageable.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Baker test is the
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coThe existence and scope of such a
ordinate political department."''
by the Court. 1 2 In Powell v.
be
resolved
to
matters
are
commitment
McCormack, the Court, while examining the "scope of any 'textual
commitment' under Art. I, § 5,"' 113 explored the historical background of
the passage in question to determine the framers' intent. In the case of
article V, there is sparse discussion in the Constitutional Convention
debates; much of the recorded deliberation deals with Congress' role in
proposing constitutional amendments rather than with their ratification.104 After brief and sporadic debate on an amending article proposed by Edmund Randolph, 10 5 James Madison proposed an amending
article virtually identical to the present article V, and, following another
day of debate, it and the entire Constitution was approved and
signed.' 06 Thus, the Constitutional Convention debates shed little light
upon the framers' intent regarding the phrase "when ratified."
Militating against a finding that the Constitution makes a textual
commitment of amendment controversies to Congress are-the indications
that the framers were unwilling to leave the entire amending process
within the exclusive control of Congress. 10 Article V requires amendments to be ratified by three-fourths of the states, and provides for an
alternative means of amendment initiation through a convention on the
application of two-thirds of the states. 0 8
Chief Justice Warren, in Powell, explained that to determine
whether there was a textual commitment, the Court must first discover if
the Constitution has granted any power to Congress through the article
and must then determine whether the exercise of that power is suscepti100. See notes 17-29 & accompanying text supra.
101. 369 U.S. at 217.
102. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1968).
103. Id.
104. See 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDmRAL CONSTrrUrTON
531 (1881).
105. Id. at 128.
106. Id. at 558.
107. Initially, the framers were reluctant to give Congress any power in the amending process. At the Convention George Mason said, "It would be improper to require
the consent of the National legislature, because they may abuse their power and refuse
their assent on that very account." Id. at 182.
108. See text accompanying notes 11-12 infra.
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ble of judicial supervision."' In the light of the Powell decision, it is
difficult to conclude that the effectiveness of state ratifications should be
left to congressional determination. Arguably, such a conclusion might
derive from the facts that one of the two ways of amendment initiation
is through the federal legislative process and that, regardless of how an
amendment is initiated, Congress determines its mode of ratificationby state legislature or by convention. However, the language of article
V clearly limits Congress' powers to (1) proposing amendments, (2)
calling a convention for proposing amendments when enough states so
request, and (3) proposing the mode of ratification. There simply is no
mention of congressional authority to interfere with the ratification
process once the mode of ratification is chosen.
The present situation is remarkably similar to that of Powell v.
McCormack, in which Congress' power with regard to expulsion of a
member was limited to the specific qualifications of age and residency
and therefore did not extend a right to exclude a member for alleged
misconduct. In other words, the Court interpreted the phrase, "Each
House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Mem-

bers" 11 to be limited to those standing qualifications set out in article I,
section 2, clause 2;.. that is, only congressional judgment as to the
standing qualifications was held to be a textually demonstrable commitment to Congress.
The textually demonstrable commitment in the constitutional
amendment process is similarly limited to proposing amendments, calling a convention should two-thirds of the states so request, and specifying one of the two modes of ratifying. At most, one can infer
additional congressional power to propose only incidental regulations to
carry out that commitment. Nor is this proposed application of the
textual commitment phase of the Baker test incompatible with the result
in Coleman v. Miller. 12 If the dictum in that case is disregarded, as it
should be, it is clear that Coleman decided only that, when a constitutional amendment may no longer be viable, the Court could not prevent
the question of the validity of a ratification after a prior rejection from
coming before the political departments. 1 3
Such an interpretation is an entirely different proposition from
reading into article V's language a textually demonstrable commitment
109.
110.
111.
112.
44 supra.
113.

395 U.S. at 519.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
See text accompanying notes 55-62 supra.
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Coleman is discussed in text accompanying notes 30307 U.S. at 450.
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to Congress to decide the effect to be given to a state's withdrawal of its
earlier ratification of a federal constitutional amendment. For, as one
commentator has observed, while
the duty imposed on Congress by Article V implies certain powers
incident to fulfilling that duty .

.

.

. [t]he Constitution commits

numerous powers to the political branches without committing
absolute11 4and unreviewable discretion in the exercise of those

powers.

Rescission Efficacy if Justiciable
Whether a state, having first ratified a proposed constitutional
amendment, can rescind that ratification, is not entirely an undecided
question in American constitutional law. With respect to three present
amendments to the federal Constitution-the fourteenth, 1 15 fifteenth," 0°
114. Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the
United States Constitution, 85 HARv. L REV. 1612, 1637-38 (1972).
115. Upon receipt of Ohio's rescission the Senate referred it to the Committee on
the Judiciary with the effect of killing the resolution. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 876-78 (1868). Secretary of State William Seward, in his announcement to Congress on the fourteenth amendment, stated:
"lit is made the duty of the Secretary of State forthwith to cause any amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which has been adopted according to the provisions of the said Constitution, to be published in the newspapers authorized to promulgate the laws, with his certificate specifying the States by which the same may have
been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a
part of the Constitution... ;
"[W hereas neither the act . . . nor any other law, expressly or by conclusive
implication, authorizes the Secretary of State to determine and decide doubtful questions . . . as to the power of any State legislature to recall a previous act or resolution
of ratification of any amendment proposed to the Constitution;
"And whereas it appears from official documents on file in this Department that
the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed as aforesaid, has
been ratified by the legislatures of the States of. . . New Jersey [and] Ohio... ;
"And whereas it further appears from official documents on file in this Department
that the legislatures of two of the States first above enumerated, to wit, Ohio and New
Jersey, have since passed resolutions respectively withdrawing the consent of each of
the said States to the aforesaid amendment; and whereas it is deemed a matter of doubt
and uncertainty whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid, and therefore ineffectual for withdrawing the consent of the said two States ....
"Now, therefore, be it known that I, WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State of
the United States . . . do hereby certify that if the resolutions of the legislatures of
Ohio and New Jersey ratifying the aforesaid amendment are to be deemed as remaining
of full force and effect, notwithstanding the subsequent resolutions of the legislatures
of those States, which purport to withdraw the consent of said States from such ratification, then the aforesaid amendment has been ratified in the manner hereinbefore mentioned, and so has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States." 15 Stat. 706-07 (1868). Thereafter, both Houses passed
concurrent resolutions declaring the adoption of the amendment. The next day the
Secretary of State certified the adoption of the amendment. Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 438-39 (1939).
116. Ohio rejected and then ratified the amendment. New York ratified and then
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and nineteenth'17--either Congress itself or the secretary of state, in
promulgating the amendments" 8 included within the requisite number
of ratifying states one or more states that had first ratified and then
purported to rescind." 9 In other words, in each instance efforts to
rescind were regarded as void and without effect.
The apparent rationale for this action by Congress and the secretary of state is that the language of article V confers upon the state
legislatures (or state ratifying conventions) only the authority to ratify'120 a proposed federal constitutional amendment.1 2' Once that function is exercised, the state legislature (or state convention) has exhausted all of its article V power, so that nothing it purports to do
thereafter in connection with the pending constitutional amendment is
of any force or effect. In 1887, Judge Jameson expressed it this way:
The power of a State legislature to participate in amending the
Federal Constitution exists only by virtue of a special grant in the
Constitution. . . . So, when the State legislature has done the act

or thing which the power contemplated and authorized-when the
rescinded. A joint resolution was introduced in Congress to declare ratification of the
fifteenth amendment. It was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and never
reached a vote. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1444 (1870). Therefore no formal
resolution was directed from Congress when Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, proclaimed the amendment ratified, including Ohio and New York in his list of states
which had ratified. 16 Stat. 1131 (1870).
117. West Virginia ratified following rejection and Tennessee attempted to rescind.
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby simply promulgated the nineteenth amendment without any questions directed to Congress. 41 Stat. 1823 (1920).
118. In 1951 Congress substituted the GSA for the Secretary of State: "Whenever
official notice is received at the General Services Administration that any amendment
proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the
provisions of the Constitution, the Administrator of General Services shall forthwith
cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States by which
the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents
and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States." Act of Oct. 31,
1951, Pub. L. No. 82-248, § 2(b), 65 Stat. 710 (codified at I U.S.C. § 106b (1970)).
119. It should be noted at this point that only in the case of the fourteenth amendment were the disputed states necessary to make up the requisite total for ratification.
As to the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments, three-fourths of the existing state legislatures ratified notwithstanding the disputed states.
120. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1428 (4th rev. ed. 1968): "Ratify. To approve and sanction; to make valid; to confirm; to give sanction to."
121. "mhe function of a State legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to
the Federal Constitution . . . is a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the . . . State." Leser
v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
"mhe power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source
in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the State derives its authority
from the Federal Constitution ......
id. at 230. See also Dodge v. Woolsey, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 331, 348 (1856).
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power ,[to ratify] has been exercised-it, ipso facto, ceases to

exist ....

122

Of course, neither Congress nor the secretary of state is bound by
principles of stare decisis. Nor, a fortiori, is the United States Supreme
Court bound by executive or legislative interpretations of constitutional
language. Nevertheless, it is submitted that past dispositions by Congress and the secretary of state were sound, both as a matter of policy
and of logic, and should be followed by the United States Supreme Court
when and if it is faced with the substantive question
of the efficacy of a
12 3
purported rescission of a state's ERA ratification.
To support the above conclusion, there is first, the very language of
article V itself. In United States v. Sprague, 21 specifically referring to
article V, the Court said:
The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters;
its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear
there is no room
for construction and no excuse for interpolation
1 25
or addition.
With those words in mind, it should be stressed that article V provides
that proposed amendments become part of the Constitution "when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof . . . ." The crucial word in this
formulation is "ratified. '120 As the Supreme Court has explained,
"ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is . . . the
expression of assent . . . of the State to a proposed amendment to the
constitution.' 2 7
Although the term "ratified" has also been used to indicate the
final result of amendment approval, that is, the attainment of approval
or ratification by three-fourths of the states, its article V meaning
is: the individual acts of ratification by each State signifying its approval and assent to the proposed amendment. That the framers intended this meaning appears from their intentions with respect to the
initial ratifications by state conventions of the original Constitution.
Replying to a letter from Alexander Hamilton, James Madison observed:
122. J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 632 (1887).
also id. at 628-30.
123. Id. at 632.
124. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
125. Id. at 731.
126. "[R]atification is but the expression of the approbation of the people . ..
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
127. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).

See

.
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,[A] reservation of a right to withdraw, if [the Bill of Rights] be
not decided on under the form of the Constitution within a certain
time, is a conditional ratification . . . . In short, any condition
whatever must vitiate the ratification. . . . The idea of reserving
a right to withdraw was started at Richmond, and considered as a
ratification which was abandoned as worse than a
conditional
12 8
rejection.
Moreover, in the light of the Court's characterization of the Constitution
as "an instrument drawn with such meticulous care and by men who so
well understood how to make language fit their thought, 11 29 the fact
that article V includes no language expressly authorizing rescission of a
once ratified amendment points strongly toward the conclusion that
rescissions were not within the framers' intent.
A second rationale supporting nonrescindability of state ratifications of constitutional amendments stems from the practical difficulty of
amending the Constitution. That amending the Constitution should be
a more difficult task than amending or passing ordinary legislation is
almost a self-evident proposition. 130 A constitution is a basic charter
for a people, designed to provide their fundamental governmental doctrine for a substantial period of time, if not indefinitely. By contrast,
legislative acts are designed to deal with specific social or economic
needs as perceived at specific times. Still, constitutions should not be
made so difficult to amend that they become virtually impossible to
alter 13 1 when, in the light of fundamentally changed perceptions of a
society's basic needs, such amendments appear necessary to massive
numbers of the people in the society governed by that constitution. The
danger to be avoided is, as Professor Orfield has observed, that the
"amending process may be made so difficult as to prevent the adoption
13 2
of amendments which are unquestionably sound.
In a two hundred year period, the United States Constitution has
been amended a mere seventeen times (counting the Bill of Rights as a
single amendment). During the same period, there have been over five
thousand amendments proposed to Congress. 8' " This low success ratio
128. 2 D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1317 (1910).
129. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931).
130. "[A]mendment of the Constitution (let us hope!) will remain a highly unusual
thing." Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
189, 195 (1972).
131. "The Constitution made the amendment process difficult, and properly so. It

certainly was not the intention of the original Convention to make it impossible."

Er-

vin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Me!hod of Amending the Con-

stitution, 66 MICH. L. REv. 875, 895 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ervin].
132. ORFIELD, supra note 36, at 210.
133.

See
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suggests that amending the federal Constitution is already an enormously
difficult undertaking. In addition, the efforts to secure passage of a
joint congressional resolution proposing the ERA spanned a fifty year
period, from 1923 to 1972.
Against this background, it is arguable
M

that the ERA has had sufficiently difficult hurdles to overcome in the
normal course of the ratification process. To confront it with an
additional, perhaps insurmountable, hurdle (the possibility, that states
which first ratified it will be able to rescind that ratification before threefourths of the states have signified their ratification of the amendment or
before the time limit for ratification has expired) is to make amending
the Constitution qualitatively much more difficult than the framers had
contemplated.
This leads to still another, more political reason supporting the
view that ratification rescissions should not be accorded any effect: the
practical exigencies of the process itself. Recognition of a power of the
states to rescind their ratifications would, it is submitted, create an
enormous potential for tactical abuse. ERA proponents, state legislators, and members of Congress were, in view of congressional precedent, 3 ' justified in presuming that once a state ratified the amendment,
no more attention need be paid to it. Recognizing that article V does
not require unanimity of endorsement, proponents have tended to select
the most promising states within which to concentrate their finite resources of funds, energy, and influence in order to achieve their goal.
Permitting a state to withdraw its ratification could upset the entire
tactical and strategic approach of the amendment's proponents in a way
not contemplated when it was first submitted to the states by Congress.
Against these considerations, there is the superficially attractive
argument in favor of allowing a state legislature to reverse its ratification
decision"3" (in either direction) on a proposed constitutional amendS. Doc. No. 163, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. iv (1963). Five
congressionally proposed amendments have not been ratified by the states. In 1789,
only ten of twelve proposed amendments were ratified to become the Bill of Rights.
The other two were articles providing for the growth of the House in proportion to
the population of the country and for the determination of congressional compensation
only when a new House had been elected. In the l1th Congress an article was proposed relating to the acceptance by U.S. citizens of titles of nobility from foreign governments. In 1861, the 36th Congress proposed an article prohibiting a constitutional
amendment to abolish slavery, and in 1924 the 68th Congress passed the child labor
amendment resolution. Id. at 244-45.
134. See note 4 supra.
135. See notes 115-17 supra.
136. See generally Comment, Constitutional Amendments-The Justiciability of
Ratification and Retraction, 41 TENN. L. REv. 93 (1973).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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ment when it decides that its earlier action was a mistake. But in view
of historical precedent, the intentions of the framers, and the difficulty
entailed in amending the federal Constitution, the unfettered right of a
state legislature to change its decision hardly seems justifiable.
Moreover, legislative mistakes in judgment with regard to adopted
constitutional amendments are not irrevocable. One need only refer to
our nation's experience with the "noble experiment."11 1 7 The American
people, having first been persuaded of the desirability of adding the
eighteenth amendment, prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes" were subsequently persuaded
to amend the federal Constitution once more by adding the twenty-first
amendment, repealing the eighteenth. What must be stressed, however,
is that in order to undo what they came to perceive as the mistake of
Prohibition, Americans had to submit to the same laborious process they
confronted when the eighteenth amendment was originally introduced
and ratified. There was no resort to the "shortcut" of rescinding
individual state ratifications prior to its total ratification by the necessary
three-fourths of the state legislatures.
We do not wish to be understood as suggesting that the American
people will regret the addition of the ERA to the federal Constitution.13
Despite the gloomy prophesies by some ERA opponents of its supposed
negative effects, we believe that the amendment will cure widespread
injustices resulting from unwarranted assumptions about the differences
between men and women. The addition of that amendment to the
federal Constitution will not, in our opinion, be a mistake.' 3 9 The point
is that, even if it is concluded after some years of experience with the
137. See generally H. ASBURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF
PROHIBITION (1950).
138. When Senator Birch Bayh presented the equal rights amendment to the Senate
for passage he said: "The women of our country must have tangible evidence of our
commitment to guarantee equal treatment under law. An amendment to the Constitution has great moral and persuasive value. Every citizen recognizes the importance
of a constitutional amendment, for the Constitution declares the most basic policies
of our Nation as well as the supreme law of the land." S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1972).
139.

See generally M. DELSMAN,

EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT ERA

(1975); Hearings on the ERA Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1971); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871 (1971).
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ERA that its adoption was a mistake, recourse in the form of repeal will
be available. 1 0
Rescission Efficacy if Not Justiciable
As indicated earlier, 141 purported rescissions by some states of their
earlier ratifications of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments were regarded as nullities by Congress, on the theory that a state's
ratification exhausts its entire power with respect to the amendment
ratified.' 42 This theory, as we have explained is sound for many
reasons. 43 Should the Court decide, however, that the issue is nonjusticiable, can one be certain that Congress will accord "rescinded" ratifications of the ERA the same treatment accorded rescissions of earlier

amendments?
That Congress would not be required to accord the same treatment

to ERA ratification rescissions as it has historically accorded rescissions
of earlier amendments flows from the fact that Congress, not being a
court, is not bound by principles of stare decisis. Nevertheless, were it
not for some congressional activity in the late 1960's and early 1970's
there would be no reason to think that Congress would treat the
ratification process surrounding the ERA any differently than it has
treated that process with respect to the fourteenth, fifteenth, and nine-

teenth amendments.
The slight uncertainty as to how Congress might treat rescissions
of ERA ratifications 44 stems from Congress' efforts, initiated in
140. From our expression of support for the ERA on the merits, some might infer
that our analysis of the amending process itself, and its conclusion that the Court can
and should decide that a state may not rescind its earlier ratification, is motivated by
partisan political considerations rather than by an objective appraisal of the relevant
constitutional language. Such an inference would be erroneous. In the years ahead
one or more proposed amendments not to our liking (e.g., an anti-abortion amendment,
an antibusing amendment, an amendment permitting capital punishment, an amendment
permitting prayer in" schools) may garner the support of two-thirds of each house of
Congress and be sent to the states for ratification. Though we would undoubtedly oppose them on the merits, we recognize that everything we have written with regard
to the process of ratifying the ERA would apply to such other amendments as well.
141. See notes 115-17 supra.
142. See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449 (1939).
143. See notes 115-40 & accompanying text supra.
144. A bill introduced in 1870 that would have made attempted withdrawal of state
ratification null and void was passed by the House. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 5356-57 (1870). It died, however, after being reported unfavorably by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1381 (1871). In the 67th
and 68th Congresses, the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment was proposed which would
have left states free to change prior action until the requisite three-fourths majority
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1967... and pursued until 1973,146 to prescribe procedures for the convention method of proposing amendments and their ratification.' 14 7
Passed in the Senate by a vote of eighty-four to nothing in 1971,148 the
bill 49 was reintroduced as S. 1272 in the 93rd Congress on March 19,
1973 by Senators Ervin and Brock.1"" It again passed the Senate on
July 9, 1973, was sent to the House the next day, but never emerged
from the House Judiciary Committee.
The bill has been called "a thoroughly misconceived piece of
legislation . . . .""
For present purposes, it is important to note that
its section 13(a) provided:
Any State may rescind its ratification of a proposed amendment by the same processes by which it ratified the proposed
had ratified or time expired. The amendment never reached a vote. 65 CONG. REC.
3675-79 (1924).
145. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See Ervin, supra note 131, at 879.
146. S. 623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 215, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971);
S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
147. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) arose after the following series of events.
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. Sims, which, on the basis of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause established the one-person-one-vote requirement: state legislative apportionment on the basis of population. Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964). That same year the Court, in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, held on the basis of Reynolds that both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned according to population notwithstanding that the state
electorate voted in favor of one house being apportioned according to other factors.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
Reacting to
these cases, especially Lucas, Senator Dirksen proposed S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965), the so-called Dirksen amendment. See Dirksen, The Supreme Court and
the People, 66 MICH. L. REV. 837, 858 (1968). The amendment would have allowed
the electorate to decide the apportionment; as long as one house was apportioned according to population, the other house could be apportioned on the basis of population,
geography, or political subdivisions. The Dirksen amendment, received a majority vote
in the Senate, but fell short of the requisite two-thirds vote for constitutional amendments.
"In December, 1964, following the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, the Seventeenth
Biennial General Assembly of the States recommended that the state legislatures petition Congress to convene a constitutional convention to propose an amendment along
the lines of the Dirksen amendment . . . . Twenty-two states submitted constitutional
convention petitions to Congress during the Eighty-ninth Congress . . . and four more
during the first session of the Ninetieth Congress . . . . If one counted the petitions
adopted by four other states, questionable in regard to their proper receipt by Congress,
this brought the total number of state petitions on the subject of state legislative apportionment to thirty-two." Ervin, supra note 131, at 877. This was two short of the
requisite two-thirds of the states.
148. 117 CONG. REc. 36804 (1971).
149. S. 215, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
150. The ERA was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, so no potential legislation could have affected its ratification. See notes 1-3 & accompanying text supra.
151. Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
189, 190 (1972).
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amendment, except that no State may rescind when there are existing valid ratifications of such amendment by three-fourth of the
States.152
Even recognizing the elasticity of the "necessary and proper"
clause' 51 of article I, section 8, there is serious doubt about Congress'
power to proscribe detailed state procedures under article V's authorization to propose one of the modes of ratification, i.e., by state convention
or by state legislatures.
In this connection, it is important to distinguish Congress' powers
with respect to the calling of a constitutional convention pursuant to
article V and its authority to prescribe state legislative procedures for
ratifying proposed amendments. Thus, Professor Bonfield has stated
that Congress does have the implied power under
its authority to call a convention . . . to fix the time and place of
meeting, the number of delegates, the manner and date of their
election, their qualifications, the basis of -apportioning delegates, the
basis for voting in convention, the vote required in convention to
propose an amendment
to the states, and the financing and staffing
54
of the convention.
By contrast, congressional power to regulate legislative rules of
procedure in ratifying amendments has been seriously questioned by
Professor Orfield. In his view:
The constitutionality of congressional regulation would seem exceedingly doubtful. The states cannot be coerced into adopting an
amendment. . . . Congress has done its work when it proposes
[the amendment and the mode of ratification], and the matter of
adoption is for the states.' 55
But even if it is determined that Congress can prescribe detailed
state legislative procedures for ratifying convention-proposed amendments, what significance attaches to the fact that the Ervin bill passed
the Senate so overwhelmingly? Does this apparent congressional endorsement of the states' freedom to rescind prior ratifications of amend152. Ervin, supra note 131, at 902. In addition, section 13(b) provided that any
state may ratify a proposed amendment even though it previously may have rejected
it and that questions concerning state ratification or rejection of amendments were to
be determined solely by Congress and its decisions were to be binding on all courts,
state and federal. Id.
153. "Congress shall have the Power ....
To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."
154. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process,
66 MICH. L. REv. 949, 987 (1968). See also Ervin, supra note 131, at 879.
155. ORFIELD, supra note 36, at 64-65. See also Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of ConstitutionalAmendment, 26 NoTan DAME LAW. 185, 208 (1951).
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ments proposed by the convention method reveal probable congressional
sentiment with respect to rescissions of proposed amendments such as
the ERA, initiated not by a constitutional convention, but by a vote of
well over two-thirds of the members of both houses of Congress?
A negative answer is warranted by the fact that ratification of
congressionally proposed amendments implicates entirely different political and social considerations than are involved when amendments are
proposed by a convention of the states convened, ultimately, as a result
of their own initiative. A constitutional convention represents an extraordinary, extra-legislative institution, one that, in many respects,
shatters the traditional tripartite division of the federal government and
becomes in effect a fourth branch.15 Though Congress may ultimately
become involved in the process, pursuant to its authority under article V
to propose a "mode" of ratification, Congress' involvement in a convention-sponsored amendment is limited. Essentially, the impetus for the
amendment comes from outside Congress itself. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Congress to assume an attitude toward
the states that in effect tells them, "You may change your decisions
about ratifying your own proposed amendment all you want, at least
until we have received valid and unrescinded ratifications of such
amendment from three-fourths of the states."
By contrast, when confronted with a congressionally sponsored
amendment, of which the ERA is an example and which is by definition
Congress' own creature, there is no reason to conclude that either the
House or the Senate ever intended to abandon the traditional approach
to ratification rescissions that had been followed in adopting the four157
teenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments.
156. "While in existence [the convention] is a separate arm of the nation, coordinate with Congress in its sphere." ORFIELD, supra note 36, at 47.
157. Moreover, the House of Representatives has never voted on the proposed leg-

islation under discussion. Even the Senate's own rationale for permitting states to rescind the ratification of convention-sponsored amendments is seriously deficient. That
rationale is based upon a perceived analogy with the right of the states to rescind their
applications to convoke a constitutional convention. S. REP. No. 293, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1973). The report of the Judiciary Committee even states: "An application
[to call a convention] is not a final action. It merely registers the state's view....
On the basis of the same reasoning, a state should be permitted to retract its ratification .... Id. The fact of the matter is, there is no precedent to support the presumption that a ratification is not a final action or that it merely registers the state's views.
As Professor Bonfield has emphasized: "Applications for a constitutional convention
. . .are merely 'formal requests' by state legislatures to Congress, requesting the latter
to call a Convention for proposing Amendments . .

dignity of finality as ratifications .......

.

.

[Tihey do not share the same

Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amend-
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Therefore, should the Court hold the issue nonjusticiable and thus
one for congressional evaluation and determination, Congress probably
will follow two hundred years of practice and decide that rescissions are
inefficacious with regard to the ERA.
Conclusion
Whether a state's purported rescission of an earlier ratification of
the proposed ERA is effective is a justiciable nonpolitical question to be
determined ultimately by the United States Supreme Court. Moreover,
the Court, in examining the merits of that question, should hold that a
purported rescission by a state that had previously ratified the amendment is null and void, since by ratifying the amendment a state exhausts
all its powers under article V. Finally, if, because of the broad discretion it retains under the Baker v. Carr test for determining the presence
of a political question as well as its present marked inclination to
exercise restraint in its dealings with Congress, the Court decides that
the effect of the purported rescissions by the ratifying legislatures is for
Congress to determine, Congress should adhere to its past practice of
counting only the earlier ratifications and ignore any subsequent
efforts at rescission.
ments by Convention: Some Problems, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 659, 671 (1964). Professor Bonfield had previously noted that ratification is the "'final act by which sovereign bodies confirm a legal or political agreement arrived at by their agents.'" Id.

